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ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY AND
REGULATORY STRATEGY IN FINANCIAL
MARKETS: POSSIBILITIES FOR UPGRADING
AND REFORM
BY MARC SCHNEIBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
Calls for reforming financial markets-and for reforming
corporate capitalism more broadly-typically invoke state regulation
and competition policy in the form of antitrust or privatization measures
as the critical countervailing mechanisms for tempering corporate
excess, protecting consumer and investor interests, and upgrading
markets.' More recent calls emphasize lighter touch or softer forms of
regulation and self-regulation, invoking information- based systems,
enhancements in rating schemes, and changes in corporate governance
that harness market forces and informed consumer choices to similar
* Marc Schneiberg, John C. Pock Professor of Sociology, Reed College
1. See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Origins and Regulatory Consequences of the
Subprime Crisis, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION
419 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss, eds., 2010); Elizabeth Warren, Redesigning
Regulation: A Case Study from the Consumer Credit Market, in GOVERNMENTS AND
MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 391 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A.
Moss, eds., 2010); John Geanakoplos, Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the
Leverage Cycle, 16 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REP., Aug. 2010, at 101;
SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 221-31 (2011); ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS'
NEW CLOTHES: WHAT'S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 208-23 (2013);
Eric Helleiner & Stefano Pagliari, THE END OF SELF-REGULATION? HEDGE FUNDS AND
DERIVATIVES IN GLOBAL FINANCE GOVERNANCE, in GLOBAL FINANCE IN CRISIS: THE
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CHANGE 74 (Erich Helleiner et al. eds., 2010);
Hubert Zimmermann, Conclusion -Whither Global Financial Regulation?, in GLOBAL
FINANCE IN CRISIS: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CHANGE 170 (Erich
Helleiner et al. eds., 2010); see generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN
CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952); THOMAS K. MCCRAW,
PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984); ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS,
WORKERS AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 1877-1917 (1999); Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley,
Organizations, Regulation, and Economic Behavior: Regulatory Dynamics and Forms from
the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century, 4 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 31 (2008) (discussing
the role of state regulation and antitrust policy unions in counter-balancing and reforming
corporate capitalism).
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ends.2 Common to many of these programs is their taking for granted
elements of existing financial market architectures which were arguably
sources of the financial crisis, including the reliance on private for-
profit provision, the centralization of flows in giant money center
institutions, an emphasis on securitization and transactional banking,
and the globalization of financial markets. 3
This Article considers an alternative, potentially complementary
strategy for tempering corporate excess and upgrading financial
markets. Specifically, it rejects institutional mono-cropping-the de
facto policy of concentrating financial services within a small number
of giant, similarly organized, and transactionally oriented investor-
owned firms-in favor of promoting parallel and more locally based
systems of community banking and cooperative, mutual, and state-
owned enterprises in financial markets. The essence of this strategy is
to work around, complement, compete with, and even partially displace
investor-owned for-profit corporations by cultivating financial
enterprises that are structured to serve different constituencies and aims
than shareholder value or the pursuit of financial profits in global
financial markets.4 Such a strategy draws on enduring and surprisingly
2. See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIONS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED
THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 397-419 (First Owl Books Edition, 2004); ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE
SUBPRIME SOLUTION: How TODAY'S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT 115-59 (2008); see also ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS
AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 1-34 (2007); Bruce Kogut & J. Muir Macpherson, The
Decision to Privatize: Economists and the Construction of Ideas and Policies, in GLOBAL
DIFFUSION OF MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 104 (Beth A. Simmons et al. eds., 2007);
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGULATION (Marie-Laure
Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson eds., 2006); Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an
Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and
Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J. Soc. 297 (2007); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997); MARY A. O'SULLIVAN,
WHAT OPPORTUNITY IS KNOCKING? REGULATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 335
(Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss, eds., 2010); Edward J. Balleisen, The Prospects for
Effective Coregulation in the United States: A Historian's View from the Early Twenty-First
Century, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 443
(Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss, eds., 2010).
3. Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, Regulating or Redesigning Finance? Market
Architectures, Normal Accidents, and ZDilemmas of Regulatory Reform, in 31 A RES. IN THE
SOC. OF ORGS. 281, 284-89 (Michael Lounsbury & Paul M. Hirsch eds., 2010); JOHNSON &
KWAK, supra note 1, at 228-31.
4. For a general statement and application across financial and non-financial sectors,
see Marc Schneiberg, Toward an Organizationally Diverse American Capitalism?
Cooperatives, Mutual, and Local, State-Owned Enterprise, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1409
(2011) [hereinafter Schneiberg, Organizationally Diverse Capitalism].
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well-developed legacies of cooperative, mutual, and public organization
across a number of American industries.5 It also draws on key insights
developed by organizations and law and economics scholars about the
importance of ownership and organizational form for the behavior of
firms. Insofar as cooperative and related alternatives to investor-owned
corporations eliminate independent shareholders, assign authority and
residual claims in firms to consumers or citizens, or foster localism and
relational exchange in financial markets, they transform relationships
and incentives among stakeholders, tying firms more closely to the
substantive economic interests of the sectors and communities they
serve. 6 In so doing, they create possibilities for investments, business
strategies, and activities that would otherwise not likely occur.
Below, this Article develops a proof of concept for this strategy
by presenting two examples of the productive use of organizational
diversity and mixed enterprise systems within the American financial
system. The first involves the promotion of a system of consumer-
5. RICHARD B. HEFLEBOWER, COOPERATIVES AND MUTUALS IN THE MARKET SYSTEM
(1980); JOSEPH G. KNAPP, THE RISE OF AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE: 1620-1920
(1969); Elizabeth Hoffman & Gary D. Libecap, Institutional Choice and the Development of
U.S. Agricultural Policies in the 19 20s, 51 J. ECON. HIST. 397 (1991); AM. PUB. POWER
Ass'N, PUBLIC POWER ANNUAL DIRECTORY & STATISTICAL REPORT 20, 22 (2011-12);
STATISTICAL REPORT: RURAL ELECTRIC BORROWERS (1980-1992); CLAUDE S. FISCHER,
AMERICA CALLING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE TO 1940 (1992); JOHN
BAINBRIDGE, BIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA, THE STORY OF MUTUAL FIRE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE (1952). For overviews across sectors, see Schneiberg, Organizationally Diverse
Capitalism, supra note 4; Marc Schneiberg, What's on the Path? Path Dependence,
Organizational Diversity and the Problem of Institutional Change in the US Economy,
1900-1950, 5 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 47 (2007) [hereinafter Schneiberg, What's on the Path?].
6. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (Belknap Press, 1996);
NONPROFIT AND CIVIL SOCIETY STUDIES: THE STUDY OF NON-PROFIT ENTERPRISE: THEORIES
AND APPROACHES (Helmut K. Anheier & Avner Ben-Ner eds., 2003); Avner Ben-Ner, On
the Stability of the Cooperative Type of Organization, 8 J. COMP. ECON. 247 (1984); Louis
Putterman, Some Behavioral Perspectives on the Dominance of Hierarchical over
Democratic Forms of Enterprise, 3 J. EcON. BEHAv. & ORG. 139 (1982); Eric Rasmusen,
Mutual Banks and Stock Banks, 31 J. L. & ECoN. 395 (1988); CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE
RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS (Univ.
of Cali., 1985); Schneiberg, Organizationally Diverse Capitalism, supra note 4, at 1422-31.
For professional-owned enterprises, see Ronald Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Sharing Among
the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How
Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313 (1985); Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis,
Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships, 2005 Q. J. ECON. 131. For
community and relational banking, see William Keeton et al., The Role of Community Banks
in the U.S. Economy, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY ECON. REV., 2d Quarter 2003, at 15;
Scott E. Hein et al. On the Uniqueness of Community Banks, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATL.
ECON. REV., Ist Quarter 2005, at 115 [hereinafter Scott E. Hein, Uniqueness of Community
Banks].
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owned mutual enterprises alongside for-profit corporations in property
insurance markets through the first half of the twentieth century. The
other involves the use of state owned banking to foster development and
a thriving ecology of local, community banks in the commercial and
industrial loan market. Both cases reflect Jeffersonian aspirations for
structuring finance. Both reveal surprising possibilities for reforming
financial markets and upgrading their performance via decentralization
and organizational diversity.
Most simply, promoting alternative systems of supply via
cooperative and related forms can subject for-profit corporations to
direct competition from firms that prioritize the interests of consumers
and local communities, tempering predatory behavior and risk-taking
excesses associated with a one-sided pursuit of shareholder value. It
can produce useful redundancies and decoupling in financial systems,
buffering local economies from crises, speculative cycles and systemic
risks, and reducing the network fragilities associated with organizing
financial markets around a small number of firms, forms and business
principles. It can expand access to capital for previously underserved
groups and seed market creation, creating new opportunities for local
and small business development, and re-harnessing financial markets to
economic growth, local communities, and the expansion of the middle
classes. And, by restructuring relations and incentives within firms and
financial transactions, cooperative and other local, community based
forms can induce new kinds of investments and services, introducing
wholly new kinds of competition into financial markets. Indeed,
strategies of promoting alternative, more locally based enterprises
within financial markets can-and have been-productively combined
with more conventional policies of regulation and antitrust to enhance
capacities for public regulatory interventions without increased risks of
capture or expanded bureaucratic controls.
The main objective in presenting these cases is to highlight
potentially important, but generally neglected, possibilities for
regulating and reforming financial markets. Yet this contribution also
intersects with broader debates over institutional design and structure.
A decade of comparative institutional scholarship has forcefully argued
that economic performance depends not just on the types of institutions
that regulate markets, but also on how the elements of those institutions
fit or cohere together, producing convergent (or complementary)
144 [Vol. 18
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signals, incentives, and supports for investment and firms' business
strategies.7  Critics counter with arguments for institutional
heterogeneity within markets, notably the benefits of having mixed,
perhaps even mismatched institutional arrangement or hybrid systems
within markets-"the mongrel over the pedigree" in Colin Crouch's
terms.8  Critics have even located the roots of the financial crisis in
these relations. Incremental regulatory reforms since the 1970s
produced too many complementary or convergent incentives for risk
taking, innovation, and the engineering of complex financial
instruments, while under producing or dismantling institutions
(typically public regulatory schemes) that counterbalanced such
incentives and compensated for the failures generated by new financial
architectures. 9 The cases presented here extend this analysis of the
productive use of heterogeneities. It traces how regulatory hedging has
profitably linked the overlay of public controls on financial markets to
foster prudence and rational risk assessment among existing providers
with more radical forms of institutional heterogeneity and hybridity in
7. Peter A. Hall & David W. Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC
ADVANTAGE I (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, eds., 2001); Margarita Estevez-Abe et al.,
Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State, in
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 145
(Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, eds., Oxford Univ., 2001); BRUNO AMABLE, THE DIVERSITY
OF MODERN CAPITALISM (2003); Peter A. Hall & Daniel Gingerich, Varieties of Capitalism
and Institutional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis, 39
BRIT. J. POL. Scl. 449 (2009).
8. COLIN CROUCH, CAPITALIST DIVERSITY AND CHANGE: RECOMBINANT GOVERNANCE
AND INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS 55 (Oxford Univ., 2005); Colin Crouch,
Complementarity and Fit in the Study of Comparative Capitalisms, in CHANGING
CAPITALISMS: INTERNATIONALIZATION, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND SYSTEMS OF ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 167 (Glenn Morgan et al. eds., Oxford Univ., 2005); Glenn Morgan,
Introduction: CHANGING Capitalisms? Internationalization, Institutional Change and
Systems of Economic Organization, in CHANGING CAPITALISMS: INTERNATIONALIZATION,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND SYSTEMS OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 1, 6-12 (Glenn Morgan
et al. eds., Oxford Univ., 2005); Martin Hopner, What Connects Industrial Relations and
Corporate Governance? Explaining Institutional Complementarity, 3 Socio-ECON. REV.
331 (2005); Schneiberg, What's on the Path?, supra note 5, at 72-74; Lane Kenworthy,
Institutional Coherence and Macroeconomic Performance, 4 SoCio-ECoN. REV. 69 (2006);
John L. Campbell, The US Financial Crisis: Lessons for Theories of Institutional
Complementarity, 9 SoCIo-ECON. REv. 211 (2011). For examples of the gradual dismantling
of legal and regulatory constraints on banking institutions' risk-taking, see Saule T.
Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the "Business ofBanking,"
63 U. Miami L. Rev. 1041 (2009); Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-
Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1683 (2011).
9. Campbell, supra note 8, at 226-27.
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financial markets, including strategies of promoting alternative
enterprises that directly alter the distribution, basic forms, and
organizing principles of providers themselves.
II. MUTUAL ENTERPRISE AND REGULATORY HEDGING
IN PROPERTY INSURANCE MARKETS
The property insurance industry from the late nineteenth century
through the first decades of the twentieth century bore some striking
resemblances to the contemporary financial system. National and
international for-profit stock companies including Aetna, INA (later
Cigna), and the Hartford dominated markets and were closely linked via
rating associations.o Companies made money not from their insurance
operations, via careful underwriting or reducing losses, but rather from
"banking profits," via investing premiums collected in securities and
other financial instruments." They focused heavily on dense urban
areas and large commercial risks, where premiums were easy to collect
in volume or values were high, yielding correlated risks in cities and
uneven coverage that left various regions and risk classes underserved. 12
And, they sold insurance though independent agents and brokers, who
were paid on commission, did not see the costs of losses, and thus had
incentives to lower underwriting standards, waive restrictions,
10. STATE OF N.Y., INTERMEDIATE REP. OF THE J. LEGIS COMM. ON HOUSING, H.R. Doc.
No. 60, AT 198-99, 202-05 (1922) [hereinafter Lockwood Report]; WILLIAM H. WANDEL,
THE CONTROL OF COMPETITION IN FIRE INSURANCE (Art Printing Co., 1935); STATE OF N.Y.,
REP. OF THE J. COMM. OF THE S. AND ASSEMB. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., APPOINTED TO
INVESTIGATE CORRUPT PRACTICES IN CONNECTION WITH LEGISLATION, AND THE AFFAIRS OF
INSURANCE COMPANIES, OTHER THAN THOSE DOING LIFE INSURANCE BUSINESS S. Doc. No.
30, at 28-35 (1911) [hereinafter Merritt Report]; ROBERT RIEGEL, FIRE UNDERWRITERS'
ASSOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (Chronicle Co., 1916); Kent H. Parker, Ratemaking in
Fire Insurance, in PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE HANDBOOK 169-89 (John D. Long
& Davis W. Gregg eds., 1965).
11. F. Harcourt Kitchin, Fire Insurance Finance, in YALE READINGS IN INSURANCE,
PROPERTY INSURANCE FIRE AND MARINE 309, 311-12 (Lester W. Zartman, ed. 1921) (1909);
Rating in Fire Insurance, W. UNDERWRITER (Chicago), Nov. 27, 1902, at 7; Lockwood
Report, supra note 10, at 207-08; ALBERT H. MOWBRAY, INSURANCE: ITS THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 422, 426-28 (McGraw Hill, 1946) (1930) (debating
"banking profits" and the sense in which "insurance carriers constitute collecting reservoirs
for investment funds.").
12. RICHARD M. BISSELL, Organization of Companies, in YALE READINGS IN
INSURANCE, PROPERTY INSURANCE FIRE AND MARINE 121, 133 (Lester W. Zartman ed. 1921)
(1909); Lester W. Zartman, Discrimination and Cooperation in Fire Insurance Rating, in
YALE READINGS IN INSURANCE, PROPERTY INSURANCE FIRE AND MARINE 225, 236-37 (Lester
W. Zartman ed. 1921) (1909); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 168-70, 205-38.
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misclassify properties, and pass risks, good and bad alike, on to the
companies (who then passed them on to largely unregulated reinsurance
pools). 13
Companies also treated their actuarial experiences as proprietary
trade secrets and resisted efforts to pool loss data and create uniform
classifications. Companies, as well as agents and regulators, were thus
without key foundations for estimating loss costs, assessing the
underlying risks of contracts, or knowing how far one could trim rates
in competing for premiums.1 4  Moreover, insurers and their rating
bureaus were stubbornly indifferent to prevention efforts and the overall
level of losses through the 1890s, which reinforced disincentives for
individual firms, agents, and insureds to invest in loss cost reduction. It
also fostered a general disregard for hazards associated with urban
growth and industrialization.15 In effect, the industry was organized as
a vehicle for gathering premiums for investments and generated
powerful incentives for high volume provision of insurance with
excessive risk taking, inadequate reserves, and accumulating correlated
risks in congested urban districts.
These features left nineteenth and early twentieth insurance
markets vulnerable to scrambles for premiums and "rate
demoralizations" that eroded reserves, amplified underwriting cycles
and market instability, and magnified rather than reduced uncertainty
13. WANDEL, supra note 10, at 11-12, 86; Merritt Report, supra note 10, at 92-93;
Zartman, supra note 12, at 243-44; Werner Sichel, Fire Insurance: Imperfectly Regulated
Collusion, 33 J. RISK & INS. 95, 104-06 (1966); Joseph C. Samprone, Jr., Rate Regulation
and Nonprice Competition in the Property and Liability Insurance Industry, 46 J. RISK &
INS. 683, 687-88 (1979); Simon Whitney, Insurance, in 2 ANTITRUST POLICIES: AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE IN TWENTY INDUSTRIES 342, 357 (Twentieth Cent. Fund, 1958); Two Kinds of
Agents, W. UNDERWRITER (Chicago), Nov. 29, 1906, at 8.
14. WANDEL, supra note 10, at 60-62; Riegel, supra note 10, at 38; Parker, supra note
10, at 178-81; Zartman, supra note 12, at 232; Merritt Report, supra note 10, at 71-73;
Miles Dawson, Scientific Fire Rating, in YALE READINGS IN INSURANCE, PROPERTY
INSURANCE FIRE AND MARINE 181, 186, 193 (Lester W. Zartman ed. 1921) (1909); Fire
Underwriters' Association of the Northwest has Successful Meeting, W. UNDERWRITER
(Chicago), Oct. 1, 1903 at 13; Shows Shortcomings of the Blanchard Law, W.
UNDERWRITER (Chicago), Aug. 22, 1907 at 18. Even the "wisest manager did know when
they were underbidding the cost," one industry expert observed. Dawson, supra note 14, at
186. So, when firms vied for business, observed another, "They did not know .. . how low
they could go and still allow a profit. [R]ates sank too low, and the companies lost heavily."
Zartman, supra note 12, at 229.
15. HEIMER, supra note 6, at 53-54, 57-76; HARRY C.BREARLEY, THE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL BOARD OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS: FIFTY YEARS OF A CIVILIZING FORCE 78
(Frederick Stokes ed. 1916); Riegel, supra note 10, at 19-24; see also WANDEL, supra note
10, at 108-09, 119-21; Merritt Report, supra note 10, at 50.
2013] 147
148 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 18
for insureds. Insureds frequently experienced rate hikes and insurance
shortages after price wars and large fires. 16  When cities burned,
companies lacked the reserves to pay in full (or at all), and experienced
waves of bankruptcies that wiped out whole segments of the industry,
followed by company reorganizations, new investments in rating
associations and enforcement schemes, and steep rate advances.' 7
In response, consumer, business, and farm groups pursued
antitrust measures and various forms of regulation, including measures
that subjected rates and rating associations to public oversight and
review. 18 They also turned en masse to organizing property insurance
16. BREARLEY, supra note 15, at 10, 26-35, 84; Robert Riegel, Rate-Making
Organizations in Fire Insurance, 70 ANNALS AM. ACAD. PoL. & Soc. SCI. 172, 183-85
(1917): WANDEL, supra note 10, at 41-45; F.C. Oviatt, History of Fire Insurance in the
United States, in YALE READINGS IN INSURANCE, PROPERTY INSURANCE FIRE AND MARINE
70, 91-92 (Lester W. Zartman ed. 1921) (1909); National Board's Report on Cincinnati, W.
UNDERWRITER (Chicago), Nov. 17, 1904, at 5; Rates Likely Will Advance, W.
UNDERWRITER (Chicago), Aug. 26, 1906, at 23. The 1898 New York rate war was one of
the worst in the industry's history. It reduced companies' New York premiums by 50%,
saddled them with risks that showed losses for years, and led companies to pull back so
tightly on the reigns that they created a three (3) year nationwide insurance shortage that left
"tough risks" in Chicago without coverage, and prevented east coast merchants from
exploiting customs rule changes. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1899, at 1, available at
http://search.proquest.com/pagepdf/95700812/Record/1406EB20A3337735099/9?accountid
=14244.
17. Nearly every U.S. city burned between 1830 and 1915, producing forty (40) major
conflagrations. Historic Conflagrations, W. UNDERWRITER (Chicago), Aug. 31, 1905, at 13.
Small conflagrations wiped out years' of profits; large ones like the 1906 San Francisco fire,
exceed the entire system's surplus and reserves. BREARLEY, supra note 15, at 101-02;
OVIATT, supra note 16, at 88 (discussing inadequate reserves); Reasons for the New Rates,
W. UNDERWRITER (Chicago), Feb. 28, 1907, at 3. This left companies unable to pay, or pay
in full. Merritt Report, supra note 10, at 105-06; BREARLEY, supra note 15, at 29-32;
WANDEL, supra note 10, at I 1; Michael Rose, State Regulation of Property and Casualty
Rates, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 677 (1967). It also resulted in companies failing in droves, as
was the case with the Chicago and Boston fires, which took out nearly 75% of the insurers
in the industry, and the Baltimore fire of 1904, which wiped out every Maryland company.
Bissell, supra note 12, at 121; Zartman, supra note 12, at 248-49; OVIATT, supra note 16, at
80, 91; Parker, supra note 10, at 170-01; Some of the Aftermath of the Baltimore Fire, W.
UNDERWRITER (Chicago), Feb. 18, 1904, at 8; Meeting of the National Board, W.
UNDERWRITER (Chicago), May 16, 1907, at 3; Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The
Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical
Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REV. 545, 547-48 (1958).
18. On the political responses to insurance industry organization, including anti-trust
measures and the regulation of rates and policy contracts, see H. ROGER GRANT, INSURANCE
REFORM: CONSUMER ACTION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 71-133 (Iowa State Univ. Press,
1979); Daniel N. Handy, Anti-Compact Laws, in HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL BOARD OF FIRE
UNDERWRITERS: FIFTY YEARS OF A CIVILIZING FORCE 282, 287-88 (Harry Brearley ed.,
1916); Marc Schneiberg, Political and Institutional Conditions for Governance by
Association: Private Order and Price Controls in American Fire Insurance, 27 POL. & Soc.
67 (1999) [hereinafter Schneiberg, Governance by Association]; Marc Schneiberg & Tim
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mutuals, producing a "veritable tidal wave" of mutualism between 1870
and 1900 resulting in nearly 3200 insurance mutuals in operation
between 1900 and 1903.19 This was an alternative system of insurance
provision structured along dramatically different institutional logics
than for-profit stock insurers, nationally organized markets, and
insurance provision for banking profits. Mutuals were consumer owned
enterprises that were tied to the substantive interests of insureds and
their economic needs as producers and property owners rather than to
the interests of an independent class of owner-investor shareholders. 20
Mutuals collectively constituted a decentralized, locally based and
organized system of insurance provision. They reflected Jeffersonian,
producer-republican visions of order and efforts by Grangers and others
to break dependence on combines, keep locally generated economic
resources at home, and forge a more decentralized economy of
independent producers, farmers, and regional markets.21 And, they
were a cooperative form of enterprise grounded in strategies of
collective self-supply and self-organization among preexisting
Bartley, Regulating American Industries: Market, Politics, and the Institutional
Determinants of Fire Insurance Regulation, 107 AM. J. Soc. 101 (2001) [hereinafter
Schneiberg and Bartley, Regulating American Industries].
19. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 161-62. Statistics on the numbers, types and
distribution of insurance mutuals were compiled from the annual directories of insurance
companies published in "A.M. BEST, BEST'S INSURANCE REPORTS: FIRE AND MARINE
(1993)," as calculated and reported in, Marc Schneiberg, Organizational Heterogeneity and
the Production of New Forms: Politics, Social Movements and Mutual Companies in
American Fire Insurance, 1900-1930, 19 RES. Soc. OF ORGs. 39 (2002) [hereinafter
Schneiberg, Mutual Companies]; Marc Schneiberg et al., Social Movements and
Organizational Form: Cooperative Alternatives to Corporation in the American Insurance,
Dairy, and Grain Industries, 73 AM. Soc. REv. 635 (2008) [hereinafter Schneiberg et al.,
Cooperative Alternatives].
20. HANSMANN, supra note 6, at 265-85; HEIMER, supra note 6, at 65-66;
HEFLEBOWER, supra note 5, at 5-10, 165-70; MOWBRAY, supra note 11, at 321-25;
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 20-21.
21. Some insurance mutuals, especially "factory mutuals," were relatively large
enterprises, held substantial assets, and operated on multi-state or even national scale. Yet
virtually all of the mutuals operating in the early twentieth century were "class mutuals,"
small, locally organized and operated enterprises associated with farmers, small
manufacturers, merchants, and independent producers that operated either on an assessment
or advance premium basis. Schneiberg, Mutual Companies, supra note 19, at 43-46. On
their relationship with Grangers, other social movements and producer-republican programs,
see Schneiberg, Mutual Companies, supra note 19, at 61-63; Schneiberg et. al., Cooperative
Alternatives supra note 19, at 637-38; see also GRANT, supra note 18, at 97; SOLON BUCK,
THE GRANGER MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION AND ITS POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL MANIFESTATIONS, 1870-1880 270-75 (1913); SPENCER L. KIMBALL,
INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 45 (1960); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 166-68; KNAPP,
supra note 5, at 46-68, 176-200.
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communities of producers and consumers.22
The introduction of multiple, competing logics or models of
provision altered-and upgraded-the dynamics of insurance markets.
First and most simply, mutuals counter-balanced the "insurance
combine" and corporate excess-overcharging, onerous terms and poor
service-by directly competing with national stock insurers and their
associations. Based on their ties to insureds, elimination of the agent-
middleman, and distinct operating advantages in selecting risks and
managing losses, mutuals could offer insurance at twenty-five percent
(25%) to as much as seventy-five percent (75%) below stock company
rates.23 They forced stock companies to cut prices and temper rate
advances as they "disturbed" the farm business in Ohio, "became quite
a factor" in mercantile risks in the Dakotas, "gobble[d] up" grain
elevator risks in Illinois, made "a hard drive" for sprinklered risks in
West, and caused "trouble" and "competition keen" in Wisconsin. 24
Mutuals served as a potent check on stock company cartels. "The
organization of fire mutuals," one observer noted in 1907,
[S]hows that stock companies cannot charge excessive
rates and expect to secure any large volume [of
business]. Recently a number of mutuals to write
various classes have been organized or are in the
formative process and yet stock rates are not unduly
high. The stiffest competition stock companies have
today is the mutuals [which] goes to show the
impossibility of any set of companies forming a
monopoly and charging excessive rates.25
22. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 186-88; HEFLEBOWER, supra note 5, at 190-92;
KNAPP, supra note 5, at 102; Sichel, supra note 13, at 96. Mutuals emerged both from both
existing local communities, "especially in German communities" in Wisconsin, and from
preexisting associations of local businesses or trades, including the Lansing Manufacturers
and Jobbers Club, the American Druggists of Cincinnati, and the Indiana Retail Hardware
Dealers Association. Druggist Company Incorporated, W. UNDERWRITER (Chicago), Feb.
15, 1906, at 21; Will Have Mutual Company, W. UNDERWRITER (Chicago), Feb. 25, 1904, at
13; Schneiberg, Mutual Companies, supra note 19, at 46, 65-66; Schneiberg et al.,
Cooperative Alternatives, supra note 19, at 650-53.
23. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 102-03; Bissell, supra note 12, at 122-23; Merritt
Report, supra note 10, at 112-14.
24. Mutual Competition Seen-Problem is Confronting Wisconsin, W. UNDERWRITER
(Chicago), Nov. 26, 1903, at 8.
25. How Competition Works, W. UNDERWRITER (Chicago), Aug. 29,1907, at 10.
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Moreover, unlike a regulatory overlay, mutuals allowed
property owners, producers, large industrial concerns and farmers alike
to opt out and effectively bypass the system of for-profit provision by
stock corporations. A mutual company represented a form of backward
"collective vertical integration" by consumers: it replaced a market
transaction and dependence on supplier firms with an ownership
relation and a strategy of local self-supply. 26 As mutuals developed in
numbers, they emerged as an alternative, decentralized system of
provision.27 And, as a system organized along qualitatively different
lines than stock corporations, they created diversity and institutional
redundancy in insurance markets, providing business groups and
regions with a buffer from the market turbulence, rate hikes, and
"insurance famines" associated with the underwriting cycles and other
ups and downs produced by profit seeking corporations and their rating
bureaus in national markets.28
Mutuals also seeded market growth. As groups and
communities scattered in different locations used mutuals to pool
resources and supply themselves collectively with insurance, they
expanded provision into previously under-served areas, even attracting
stock corporations into newly developing regions and lines in the
Midwest and plains states.29 Such dynamics were not trivial. Property
26. HEFLEBOWER, supra note 5, at 9-10; Sichel, supra note 13, at 96; HANSMANN,
supra note 6, at 267, 276-81.
27. Factory mutuals captured significant market share in commercial and industrial
lines. Class mutuals, including farm, town, and county mutuals also wrote large volumes of
business throughout the Midwest as well as western Pennsylvania and upstate New York,
capturing approximately forty percent (40%) of the farm business by 1921. During the first
two decades of the twentieth century, mutuals wrote roughly eleven percent (11%) of the
nation's fire insurance business, with shares in some places, like Wisconsin, reaching as
high as thirty-five percent (35%). Schneiberg, Mutual Companies, supra note 19, at 48-51
and sources cited therein.
28. Property owners routinely exercised this "opt out" option by flocking to mutuals in
droves-or organizing new mutuals-when faced with rate hikes, insurance shortages, or
policies after rate wars and conflagrations. Ohio and West Virginia-Mutual Company
Begins Operations, W. UNDERWRITER (Chicago), May. 22, 1902, at 9-10; BREARLEY, supra
note 15, at 8-10; OVIATT, supra note 16, at 82-83; Bissell, supra note 12, at 128-29; GRANT,
supra note 18, at 96-99.
29. HANSMANN, supra note 6, at 281; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 168-78, 205-38.
Farm, small business and mercantile risks in developing regions in the Midwest and plains
states were often considered a distinct class of business whose character varied considerably
by locality, which required extensive investments in local agent networks to win business
from sometimes hostile insures, and which were strongly marked by local sentiments,
leaving most general business stock insurers uninterested in the trade and creating
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insurance was a condition for credit, and credit for commerce and trade,
which made insurance an infrastructure resource on par with banks,
railroads, and electrical utilities in credit-dependent sectors of the
economy. Failures to provide a steady supply of insurance to
businesses, farms and households were an impediment to economic
development.30 Moreover, as insurance mutuals proliferated, they did
so regionally. As Figure One's geography of mutuals by state in 1903
shows, they emerged in greatest number in places like Wisconsin,
Minnesota, Missouri, and Nebraska, creating possibilities for expanded
credit and decentralized development in what were becoming the mixed
economy regions of the upper Midwest and plains states. 31  Here,
heterogeneity went beyond counterbalancing corporations or toning
down excess to alter incentives in markets and foster market
development, harnessing the insurance system to support regional
development and middle class communities rather than simply serving
financial profits.32
reluctance even among the two general insurers that did such business to commit fully to
underwriting in Wisconsin and Michigan in the early 1900s. For additional information, see
W. UNDERWRITER, Jan. 10, 1901, at 7-8. Underserved lines that also turned to mutuals also
included electrical and traction companies, whose bondholders demanded more insurance
that the stock companies' railroad men were willing to supply lumbermen, millers, and
factories in the Midwest. For additional information, see W. UNDERWRITER Sep. 8, 1904, at
I1; W. UNDERWRITER, Mar. 12, 1903, at 11; W. UNDERWRITER, July 3, 1902, at 9.
30. Merritt Report, supra note 10, at 26; MOWBRAY, supra note 11, at 8-9; BREARLEY,
supra note 15, at 206-09.
31. The geography of mutuals partly reflected local economic conditions. Farmers and
small business in the upper Midwest and plains states found themselves increasingly
dependent on corporate combinations during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, and mobilized mutuals and cooperatives as organizational weapons against
predatory corporations and concentration in critical markets like fire insurance. But, the
geography of mutuals also reflected the evolution in the region of social and political
infrastructures for cooperative organization, including the development of stable and
relatively homogenous local communities; the prevalence of German and Scandinavian
immigrants, who brought cooperative templates and experiences from their home countries;
and, anti-corporate and reform movements, including the Grange, which served as
advocates, promoters and incubators for cooperative and mutual enterprise. See generally
Schneiberg, Mutual Companies, supra note 19; Schneiberg et al., Cooperative Alternatives,
supra note 19; Schneiberg, Organizationally Diverse Capitalism, supra note 4.
32. See Schneiberg, Organizationally Diverse Capitalism, supra note 4, at 1423-31
(discussing the role of mutuals and cooperatives more generally in making and expanding
markets in infrastructure industries and fostering broader, more regionally balanced
economic development).
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Equally important, mutuals transformed the incentives firms and
insurers faced regarding loss costs, and through those, the dynamics of
competition in insurance markets. For-profit provision via investor-
owned stock companies yielded disincentives for insurers and property
owners to invest in reducing losses, whether by developing engineering
expertise, redesigning factories and buildings, or installing prevention
technologies. 33 Stock companies generally reckoned their underwriting
operations in terms of loss (and expense) ratios, and were indifferent to
the burning rates so long as they could use their rating machinery or
sales forces to sustain acceptable ratios of premiums to losses. Until the
1890s, companies were indifferent to prevention and simply underwrote
risks "as found."34  Moreover, investments in prevention were costly,
were subject to information asymmetries, and had collective goods or
33. See HEIMER, supra note 6, at 57-64, 68, 74-76; HANSMANN, supra note 6, at 276-
84; see also BREARLEY, supra note 15, at 78-90; Merritt Report, supra note 10, at 73-74,
109; BISSELL, supra note 12, at 127; MOWBRAY, supra note I1, at 38.
34. BREARLEY, supra note 15, at 78 (quoting the President of the National Board of
Fire Underwriters in 1892); see HEIMER, supra note 6, at 61.
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transaction specific properties. Stock companies that invested in
developing expertise or improving clients' facilities faced the risk that
policyholders would switch firms rather than share those costs via
accepting higher premium rates or other means. Companies were also
at a disadvantage relative to clients in assessing both the hazards
associated with particular plants, technologies, or processes, and the
extent to which insureds invested or skimped on taking precautions.
Companies were thus unwilling to make rate concessions when clients
claimed they had reduced hazards or otherwise provide policyholders
with incentives for prevention. Nor were any such incentives
forthcoming where declining prices during rate wars decoupled rates
from hazards or when commission agents vied to keep clients by
relaxing underwriting standards.35 Prior to mutuals, there was thus little
systematic investment in prevention and accumulating frustration
among insureds with companies' refusals to reduce rates for
improvements in plants and the like.
Mutuals, in contrast, aligned incentives for prevention,
improvement, and lost cost reduction by making consumers the owners
of the enterprise. As associations of property owners in the same trade
or area, mutuals could both tap into and develop specialized expertise
about plants, processes and local business conditions, and exploit local
networks to foster taking due care.36  In addition, as owners of the
association, insureds could use the company to support and reward
investments by owner-insureds in prevention and loss cost reduction,
whether through dividends, reduced or no assessments, or lower
35. See, e.g., WANDEL, supra note 10, at 108-09 (discussing how commissions were "a
corruption fun ... which blinds at least some agents to every consideration outside their
commission," inducing "a laxity in the transaction of the business on a scale so extensive as
to produce an almost criminal increase in the fire waste."); Merritt Report, supra note 10, at
50 (discussing how price wars or "rate demoralizations" create situations in which
carelessness "will not be penalized through the rate. . .which manifests itself in an increased
burning rate.").
36. Edward Atkinson, Factory Mutual Fire Insurance, in YALE READINGS IN
INSURANCE, PROPERTY INSURANCE FIRE AND MARINE 369, 370-75 (Lester W. Zartman ed.
1921) (1909); HEIMER, supra note 6, at 60-68; OVIATT, supra note 16, at 83-84; HANSMANN,
supra note 6, at 280; BISSELL, supra note 12, at 123. "The policy holders, in a sense,
constitute a family," wrote one contemporary observer. "They are bound together by
neighborly ties, and this almost eradicates the moral hazard." Schneiberg, Mutual
Companies, supra note 19, at 54. According to another, a policyholder "would naturally
prefer not to make his neighbor pay his loss, and particularly pass upon it, when he could as
easily work a corporation, which would send a stranger to make the adjustment. A farmer's
character is known to his neighbors, and if not of the best, he would be more inclined to
excite suspicion if they had to pay his loss." Id. at 53, 54.
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insurance rates, while refusing to transact with clients that "neglect their
own duty." 37 Mutuals established a quid pro quo of tying rates more
closely to documented hazards and passing savings from reduced loses
onto insureds. Moreover, as mutuals evolved and spread, they not only
developed increasingly sophisticated engineering, research, and
inspection facilities, and worked closely with insureds to redesign
plants. They also developed and diffused a stream of new prevention
protocols and technologies,3 8 making serious inroads into both farm
risks and large, commercial insurance lines. 39
Mutuals' success forced stock corporations to follow suit, and
fueled a new form of rivalry in insurance markets-competition based
on improvement, consultation, and loss cost reduction-contributing to
a roughly sixty percent (60%) reduction in the average loss costs from
fires per $100 of coverage over the first four decades of the twentieth
century.40
[T]o the mill mutuals belong most of the credit for the
inception of what is being done today toward the
prevention of fire. The stock companies are now
thoroughly committed to this work themselves, but they
have been largely driven into by the competition and
example of the factory mutuals.4 1
Indeed, it was largely in response to mutuals and the new
37. HEIMER, supra note 6, at 61; ATKINSON, supra note 36, at 369-70.
38. These included the refinement and installation of automatic sprinklers; fire doors
and the enclosure of stairways and other vertical passages between floors; refinements and
redesign of wooden posts, lubricating oil, and illumination methods; changes in the design
of roofs, including the elimination of Mansard roofing; a revolution in factory, warehouse,
and department store layout; and systematic record keeping about the sources of fires.
ATKINSON, supra note 36, at 378-91; HEIMER, supra note 6, at 62-64, 70; BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 5, at 189-98; Merritt Report, supra note 10, at 109-14.
39. After capturing much of the textile and paper mill businesses in the northeast,
mutuals operating in the Midwest by 1900 had captured much and in some cases most of the
grain and flourmill business, the lumber trades, traction and electrical power companies, and
the hardware and drug retail trade. The factory mutuals also captured a roster of notables in
the industrial belt, including Deering and McCormick, Allis Chambers, Western Electric,
American Radiator, and Armor. Schneiberg, Mutual Companies, supra note 19, at 48-49
and references cited therein.
40. A.M. Best, supra note 19, at 27.
41. Merritt Report, supra note 10, at 111; OVIATr, supra note 16, at 94; MOWBRAY,
supra note 11, at 38; ZARTMAN, supra note 12, at 245.
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competition they fostered in insurance markets that stock companies
organized the Factory Insurance Association for inspecting risks, the
Underwriters Laboratories, and the National Fire Prevention
Association. These organizations more broadly institutionalized the
pricing principles, prevention efforts, and quid pro quos that mutuals
had pioneered. 42 Such principles and quid pro quos even transformed
the competitive game for agents.
[P]roperty owners are making a study of fire protection
and the agent stands to him as an expert adviser ....
heretofore, the "personal equation" has been a large
factor in soliciting ... . [Now] the agent who can show
the assured how to get a lower rate by making
improvements will be the man who gets the business. 43
Finally, in their progressive era struggles to create the public
administrative machinery to regulate rates, lawmakers and state officials
recognized these benefits. They coupled proposals for state regulation of
stock corporations, rating associations and markets with hedging or
hybridization strategies that deliberately cultivated mutual forms and
diversity within insurance markets. "It is believed that there is enough
competition [from mutuals and independents] to keep rates from
becoming excessive," concluded New York's influential 1910 Merritt
Committee investigation regarding how the states might regulate stock
company associations:
[I]t is important that this beneficial and regulative form
of competition should be retained and increased if
possible. This can be done, for instance, by opening the
way to a free competition by the factory mutuals and the
miscellaneous mutuals which have ... so well justified
their existence. Such companies can unquestionably, if
they receive proper supervision, exert a very wholesome
influence in the direction of economic and the
prevention of fires . . . the Committee believes that
42. OVIATT, supra note 16, at 94-95; BREARLEY, supra note 15, at 78-83, 87-94, 104-
14, 162-77; ZARTMAN, supra note 12, at 245.
43. Modem Fire Insurance Agents, W. UNDERWRITER (Chicago), Oct. 15, 1903, at 7.
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every reasonable effort should be made to induce these
companies to enter the State of New York ... and that
therefore the law be so amended.4
The property insurance case highlights some important effects
of organizational diversity on financial market performance-and some
surprising prospects for productively using diversity as a means for
reform. Insurance mutuals served as countervailing forces in markets,
tempering predatory inclinations of stock company cartels. They
created redundancy and decentralized circuits in the system, buffering
local economies from volatility and crises in insurance markets, and
reduced network fragilities associated with concentration and correlated
risk. Moreover, their structural features made mutuals effective
vehicles for making and upgrading insurance markets, both by
broadening provision and expanding possibilities for local economic
development, and by transforming incentives for innovation in loss
reduction, which introduced new forms of competition into the industry.
Nor did such effects pass unnoticed, particularly among the architects of
prior approval regulation, who strove to enhance standard regulatory
schemes by combining them with measures to promote mutual
enterprise.
III. PUBLIC ENTERPRISE AND LOCAL COMMUNITY BANKS
IN COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL LENDING
The Bank of North Dakota ("BND") and its links to community
banks in the state constitute a second instance of using organizational
diversity and multiple logics to reform and upgrade financial markets.
The BND emerged from some of the same populist mixes of anti-
monopoly politics and producer-republican movements for economic
independence and local development that fueled insurance mutuals.45
However, it went beyond state regulation to introduce public ownership
into the heart of the state's financial markets, and was formed in 1919
44. Merritt Report, supra note 10, at 108-09, 114; see Schneiberg, Governance by
Association, supra note 18, at 86.
45. ALVIN S. TOSTLEBEE, THE BANK OF NORTH DAKOTA: AN EXPERIMENT IN AGRARIAN
BANKING, STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC LAW 36-67 (Columbia Univ.,
1924); ROZANNE E. JUNKER, THE BANK OF NORTH DAKOTA: AN EXPERIMENT IN STATE
OWNERSHIP iii-v, 1-11 (Fithian Press, 1989).
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as a part of the Non-Partisan League's broader program of using public
ownership of grain mills, terminal exchanges, insurance facilities, and
the like to wrest control over economic infrastructure from out-of-state
interests. 4 6 The BND is a wholly state owned and operated bank-the
only one of its kind in the United States currently. 47 It is the bank for
the state of North Dakota, serving as the depository for all of the state's
funds, including taxes and fees collected by the state and its public
subdivisions as well as working funds for state institutions (excepting
pension funds and other trusts managed by the state). 48 And, it devotes
those resources to funding development, agriculture, and small
businesses within the state, mainly by working with and through the
state's local community banks. 49 The BND is, in effect, the heart of a
state/community bank hybrid-a case of public ownership in banking
organized to foster local economic development, small business growth,
as well as localism and relational banking via community banks and
credit unions.50 It thus stands out as a striking contemporary alternative
46. TOSTLEBEE, supra note 45, at 62-67; JUNKER, supra note 45, at 4-6; P. FISHER,
PUBLIC BANKS IN AMERICA: HISTORY AND CURRENT OPPORTUNITIES (Univ. of Iowa Inst. of
Urban and Regional Res., 1981).
47. JUNKER, supra note 45, at i; Rob Garver, Reluctant Role Model, AM. BANKER (Apr.
1, 2011), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/magazine/121_4/reluctant-role-
model-1034650-1 .html?zkPrintable-true); YOLANDA K. KODRZYCKI & TAL ELMATAD, NEW
ENGLAND PUB. POL. RESERVE CTR., FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, THE BANK OF NORTH
DAKOTA: A MODEL FOR MASSACHUSETTS AND OTHER STATES? 3 (2011).
48. Garver, supra note 47, at 1; INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, BANK OF NORTH
DAKOTA 1 (2011) [hereinafter ILSR], available at http://www.ilsr.org/rule/bank-of-north-
dakota-2/; Josh Harkinson, How the Nation's Only State-Owned Bank Became the Envy of
Wall Street, MOTHER JONES 1-2 (Mar 27, 2009), available at
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2009/03/how-nationE2%80%99s-only-state-owned-
bank-became-envy-wall-street.
49. Harkinson, supra note 48, at 1-2; KODRZYCKI & ELMATAD, supra note 47, at 7;
JUNKER, supra note 45, at iv-v; JASON JUDD & HEATHER MCGHEE, BANKING ON AMERICA:
How MAIN STREET PARTNERSHIP BANKS CAN IMPROVE LOCAL ECONOMIES 2-4, 12 (Demos
2010) [hereinafter JUDD & McGHEE, BANKING ON AMERICA], available at
http://www.demos.org/publication/banking-america-how-main-street-partnership-banks-
can-improve-local-economies; CTR. FOR STATE INNOVATION, WASHINGTON STATE BANK
ANALYSIS 2-3 (2010) [hereinafter CSI], available at
http://www.stateinnovation.org/statebanks.aspx.
50. JUDD & MCGHEE, BANKING ON AMERICA, supra note 49, at 2, 4; Christopher
Matthews, Are State-Owned Banks the Antidote to the Too-Big-To-Fail Epidemic?, TIME,
Jan. 15, 2013, at 1, available at http://business.time.com/2013/01/1 5/are-state-owned-banks-
the-antidote-to-the-too-big-to-fail-epidemic/; Katrina vanden Heuvel, Banking for the
People, THE NATION, Feb. 7, 2011, at 1, available at
http://www.thenation.com/blog/158350/banking-people#; Marc Schneiberg, Lost in
Transposition? (A Cautionary Tale): The Bank of North Dakota Model and Prospects for
Reform in American Banking, in 39A INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS IN ACTION, RES. IN THE SOC. OF
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to the market-oriented, increasingly global and centralized system of
securitization and private, for-profit transactional banking that has come
to dominate American finance.
In its over ninety years of operation, the BND has used the
funds deposited with it by the state in three basic ways. First, it has
provided short term and bond financing for local and state government
infrastructure projects in North Dakota, lowering borrowing costs by
using its access to low cost funds from regional Federal Home Loan
Banks and providing letters of credits for tax exempt bonds.5 ' Second,
it does some direct lending to private borrowers in the state, playing a
major role in financing farms and grain sales in the first half of the
twentieth century. The BND also currently lends directly for student
loans as well as new small business and agricultural start-ups.52 But,
third and most importantly, the BND is not a retail bank. It has no retail
branches, has no ATM cards, has available-but does not market-
checking and savings services to private individuals, does very few
loans directly, and competes directly with other banks in only one major
area-student loans. 53 Rather, the BND has and continued to serve
mainly as a wholesale bank for the state's community banks and credit
unions. It participates in loans originated by local banks (by expanding
the size of the loan, providing loan guarantees, or buying interest rates
down); purchases loans from local bank portfolios (including active
participation in the secondary market for Small Business
Administration, FHA, and student loans); and purchases and lends on
community bank stock. 54 It also provides other bankers' bank services
to local banks, including clearing checks, operating as their depository
ORGS. 277, 280-84 (Michael Lounsbury & Eva Boxenbaurn eds., 2013).
51. JUNKER, supra note 45, at 112-14, 137; JUDD & McGHEE, BANKING ON AMERICA,
supra note 49, at 2, 7-8.
52. JUNKER, supra note 45, at 98; TOSTLEBEE, supra note 45, at 163-71; ANNUAL
REPORT: 90 YEARS OF EVOLUTION, BANK OF NORTH DAKOTA 2, 6-7, 10-11 (2009)
[hereinafter BND], available at
http://banknd.nd.gov/financials and-compliance/annual-reports.html.
53. Garver, supra note 47, at 4; KODRZYCKI & HELMSTAD, supra note 47, at 8;
Interview with Ed Sather, Retired Senior Vice President of Treasury and Trust Services, Ctr.
for State Innovation (Feb. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.stateinnovation.org/statebanks.aspx.
54. KODRZYCKI & HELMSTAD, supra note 47, at 8; Harkinson, supra note 48, at 2;
ILSR, supra note 48, at 2; JUNKER, supra note 45, at 137, 141, 148-49; CSI, supra note 49,
at 2-3.
2013] 159
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
for reserves, bond accounting, and providing federal funds lines. 55
Here, too, introducing institutional heterogeneity and an
alternative to for-profit money-center banking reconfigured markets and
upgraded their performance. First, the BND creates an alternative,
decentralized, and regionally based circuit of capital for North Dakota's
small business, farmers, and local governments, providing a dedicated
source of funds for commercial and industrial loans and Main Street
communities, and retying the financial sector to local economic and
small business development. With the BND, state tax revenues and
funds collected by other public subdivisions are kept within the state.
They are deposited in the BND, recycled mainly though the state's
community banks into local lending, and used to support local and
longer term development, rather than being deposited with out-of-state
banks, whisked away into national or global financial markets, loaned
out of state, invested in derivatives, and used for the pursuit of financial
profits as is virtually universal practice elsewhere.56 As the BND
President Eric Hardmeyer explained in an interview:
Our funding model, our deposit model is really what is
unique as the engine that drives that bank. And that is
we are the depository for all state tax collections and
fees. And so we have a captive deposit base, we pay a
competitive rate to the state treasurer. But that's only
one portion of it. We take those funds, and then, what
really separates us is that we plow those deposits back
into the state of North Dakota in the form of loans. We
invest back into the state in economic development. 5
In fact, while the BND did engage in some mortgage backed
security transactions, it did no subprime lending. It largely avoided
derivatives markets, credit default swaps, and the like during the run up
55. CSI, supra note 49, at 2-3; Sather, supra note 53, at 6-8.
56. Vanden Heuvel, supra note 50, at 1-2; Ellen Brown, Whose Bank? Public
Investment, Not Private Debt, YES MAGAZINE, Feb. 19, 2010, at 1, 3, available at
http://www.yesmagazine.org/new-economy/campaign-for-state-owned-banks; JASON JUDD
& HEATHER C. McGHEE, PUTrING OR-EGON'S MONEY TO WORK FOR OREGON: INTRODUCING
THE VIRTUAL STATE BANK 2 (Demos, 2011) [hereinafter JUDD & McGHEE, OREGON
VIRTUAL STATE BANK], available at http://www.stateinnovation.org/statebanks.aspx;
Garver, supra note 47, at 2, 4.
57. Garver, supra note 47, at 1-2.
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to the financial crisis, and actually shifted away from investing in
securities to expand substantially both its lending and its focus on
traditional lending within the state from 1990 to 2005.
Second, the BND has served as shock absorber, buffering the
state's small business, farm, and public sectors from economic crises,
financial meltdown, and natural disasters. During the Great Depression,
the BND held farm mortgages, and like banks everywhere, ended up
holding the farms themselves as farmers became unable to make
mortgage payments. Roughly one third of the state's farm families lost
every bit of equity they had in their farms, and the BND and other state
agencies ended up owning nearly one-fifth of the entire state of North
Dakota in the 1940s.59 Yet, unlike banks in virtually every other state,
which foreclosed and dispossessed farm families en masse, the BND
pursued policies of keeping farmers on their land.60 It pursued loan
forgiveness and moratoriums on trying to collect on debts. When it did
foreclose, or when farmers could no longer pay, it let farm families who
were actually working the land stay on the farm through low or no cost
rental schemes, and promised to extend loans to farmers if farmers
promised to pay taxes. Moreover, when farm conditions recovered in
the 1940s, the BND sold those farms back to farmers or their families,
often at below market rates, cushioning the state from some of the worst
consequences of the Depression and helping to preserve the state's
small farm sector. In a parallel effort to buffer communities and their
public institutions, the BND became an active lender to schools, welfare
agencies, sanitation works, and other political subdivisions when falling
tax revenues left them unable to pay bills, including providing teachers
cash for the full face values of the warrants they had received in lieu of
salaries. 6 1
58. Garver, supra note 47, at 3; 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, BANK OF NORTH DAKOTA 5
(2008), available at http://banknd.nd.gov/financials-and-compliance/annualreports.html);
KODRZYCKI & ELMASTAD, supra note 47, at 8 (showing that investment securities as a
percent of BND assets shrank from roughly fifty percent (50%) to ten percent (10%)
between 1990 to 2005, while loans as a share of assets grew from roughly twenty percent
(20%) to nearly seventy percent (70%)).
59. JUNKER, supra note 45, at 116.
60. JUNKER, supra note 45, at 116-31; KODRZYCKI & ELMASTAD, supra note 47, at 7-8;
Peter Fisher, The Role of the Public Sector in Local Development Finance: Evaluating
Alternative Institutional Arrangements, 17 J. ECON. ISSUES 133, 147 (1983); see also
PRAIRIE PUBLIC BROADCASTING, BANK OF NORTH DAKOTA (2005), available at
http://www.prairiepublic.org/television/prairie-public-on-demand/bank-of-north-dakota.
61. JUNKER, supra note 45, at 108-15.
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Similarly, during the recent financial crisis, the BND increased
its lending, unlike virtually every other bank, helping to mitigate credit
crunches in the state's commercial and industrial loan markets, and
providing financial support for small businesses to weather the storm.
The recent crisis involved a wholesale collapse of liquidity and lending
not just in mortgage markets, but also in commercial and industrial
loans. Small businesses across the country had to scramble for funds
and rely on credit cards charging over twice the average rates of small
business loans as money-center banks abandoned small business
commercial and industrial loan markets in favor of overseas investments
and securities. 62 Between 2007 and 2010, JP Morgan Chase, Wells
Fargo, Citigroup, and Bank of America cut the number of their small
business SBA 7(a) loans overall by fifty-three percent (53%), with
Citigroup slashing SBA loans by sixty-four percent (64%) and Bank of
America going even farther, reducing them by ninety (90%) to one
hundred percent (100%) in Oregon, Washington, Maryland, and
Massachusetts. 63 In contrast, the BND more than doubled its industrial
and small business lending from 2005 to 2011. It steadily increased its
commercial and industrial (C&I) loan portfolio from $431 million in
2005 to $1.064 billion in 2008, with only small dips in 2009 and 2010
(from $1.039 to $1.022 billion) and a new height of $1.068 billion in
2011.64 Furthermore, in its effort to avoid a credit freeze, the BND used
62. JUDD & MCGHEE, BANKING ON AMERICA, supra note 49, at 6; CSI, supra note 49,
at 1.
63. JUDD & McGHEE, BANKING ON AMERICA, supra note 49, at 5-6; JUDD & MCGHEE,
OREGON VIRTUAL STATE BANK, supra note 56, at 1; JASON JUDD & HEATHER MCGHEE,
PUTTING WASHINGTON MONEY To WORK FOR WASHINGTON: INTRODUCING THE VIRTUAL
STATE BANK I (Demos, 2011), available at http://www.stateinnovation.org/statebanks.aspx;
JASON JUDD & HEATHER MCGHEE, PUTTING MASSACHUSETTS MONEY To WORK FOR
MASSACHUSETTS: INTRODUCING THE MASSACHUSETTS PARTNERSHIP BANK 1 (Demos, 2011),
available at http://www.stateinnovation.org/statebanks.aspx; JASON JUDD & HEATHER
McGHEE, PUTTING MARYLAND MONEY To WORK FOR MASSACHUSETTS: INTRODUCING THE
MARYLAND PARTNERSHIP BANK I (Demos, 2011), available at
http://www.stateinnovation.org/statebanks.aspx; JASON JUDD & HEATHER McGHEE, PUTTING
MAINE MONEY TO WORK FOR MAINE: INTRODUCING THE MAINE STREET ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT BANK I (Demos, 2011), available at
http://www.stateinnovation.org/Initiatives/State-Banks-
Materials/Demos OPMEMaine Street Bank-paper.aspx.
64. BND, supra note 52, at 3; 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, BANK OF NORTH DAKOTA 5
(2011), available at http://banknd.nd.gov/financials-and-compliance/annual-reports.html;
John Nichols, Banking for the People: Across the Country, The Notion of State-Owned
Banks is Catching on, THE NATION, Mar. 11, 2010, at 2, available at
http://www.thenation.com/article/banking-people.
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its access to the federal funds markets in 2007-08 to purchase a
substantial number of loans from the state's community banks to
enhance their capital position and lending capacities as the economy
turned down.
Nor are the BND's capacities to buffer local communities and
the state's economies from shocks restricted to economic or financial
crises. It has also rapidly diverted resources to areas affected by flood
and drought, even taking an anticipatory stance in advance of natural
disasters to foster economic and community resilience. 65 For instance,
in 1997, the BND promptly extended Grand Forks a $25 million line of
credit to help it survive being economically crippled by massive
flooding in that year, enabling it to hold onto its population while its
sister city across the river, East Grand Forks, Minnesota, lost seventeen
percent (17%) of its population over the following three years. 66
Last, but hardly least, the BND has played and continues to play
a vital role in fostering and anchoring a small bank sector of community
based relational banking within the state, working against the broader
trend in the American financial system in which community banks have
steadily lost ground.67 Part of this is rooted in the BND's policies of
making loans to individual North Dakotans to buy bank stocks, which
helps sustain local-and locally owned-banking. 68 But, pivotal here is
the BND's role in participation lending. 69  Small community banks
often need partners when their clients approach them for loans that
exceed their capital or lending limits. In most states, small originating
banks turn to large commercial banks like Wells Fargo, CITI, or Chase
to participate in those loans. Partners at such commercial banks charge
them fees and use their participation to gather information on borrowers
and then poach clients away from the originating banks. This has put
65. Harkinson, supra note 48, at 2; KODRZYCKI & ELMASTAD, supra note 47, at 10;
Interview with Karl Bollingberg, President Alerus Financial, North Dakota, Advisory Bd.,
Bank of North Dakota, Transcript of Interviews with BND Leadership (July 10, 2010),
available at http://www.stateinnovation.org/statebanks.aspx.
66. Garver, supra note 47, at 1.
67. Keeton et al., supra note 6, at 19; KODRZYCKI & ELMASTAD, supra note 47, at 16.
68. ILSR, supra note 48, at 2; Garver, supra note 47, at 4.
69. See JUDD & McGHEE, BANKING ON AMERICA, supra note 49, at 6-7; Sather, supra
note 53, at 4-5; Bollingberg, supra note 65, at 7; see also ILSR, supra note 48, at 2;
Harkinson, supra note 48, at 2; Interview with Gary Peterson, Lakeside Bank, North
Dakota, Advisory Bd., Bank of North Dakota, Transcript of Interviews with BND
Leadership (July 10, 2010), available at http://www.stateinnovation.org/statebanks.aspx;
CSI, supra note 49, at 2-3.
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pressure on small banks to withhold information and aggressively
pursue growth and consolidation to stay in business. The BND, in
contrast, does no direct lending in commercial and industrial loans. It
only lends through the originating community bank, and thus never uses
its loan participation to poach business from or cut out local banks,
which means that the state's banks can stay smaller and local and
remain in the C&I game. 70 Moreover, the BND charges its partners
lower fees than traditional banks and rebates expenses, which helps with
originators' cost structures and permits lower cost loans to small
businesses in the state.
Overall, this has helped preserve an ecology of small,
community based banks and relational banking networks between-and
among-lenders and borrowers .71 North Dakota's banking sector has
far more branches per capita than banks overall or banks in states such
as South Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana. It is also far less
concentrated, and has steadily declined in its concentration since
1995.72 The North Dakota banking sector is half as concentrated as
Montana's and an order of magnitude less concentrated than South
Dakota's, which recently came to be dominated by Wells Fargo. 73 in
fact, small and local community banks in 2002 accounted for seventy-
eight percent (78%) of the bank branches in North Dakota, more than in
any other state, and fifty-nine percent (59%) of deposits, more than in
any other state except Kansas and Iowa. 74 In 2009, money center banks
accounted for fewer deposits (twenty percent (20%)) in North Dakota
than in any other state.75
The preservation of a thriving ecology of small, local
community banks has important effects on the state's financial markets.
It brings with it an emphasis of relational over transactional banking
networks between lenders and borrower, supporting ongoing personal
ties, "thick" information from in-depth knowledge of client operations
70. Bollingberg, supra note 65, at 7.
71. Peterson, supra note 69, at 9; Bollingberg, supra note 65, at 8; ILSR, supra note
48, at 2-3; Sather, supra note 53, at 4; Matthews, supra note 50, at 1; KODRZYCKI &
ELMASTAD, supra note 47, at 16.
72. CSI, supra note 49, at 3-5.
73. CSI, supra note 49, at 4; KODRZYCKI & ELMASTAD, supra note 47, at 13.
74. Keeton et al., supra note 6, at 22.
75. Thomas M. Hoenig, President of the Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City, Speech at the
Am. Bankers Ass'n Gov. Relations Summit: Are Community Banks Important? 6 (Mar. 18,
2010), available at www.kansascityfed.org/SpeechBio/HoenigPDF/Hoenig.3.18.201 0.pdf.
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and local business conditions, longer term time horizons in lending, and
the tailoring of loans and lending services. 76  It has also fostered a
network of ongoing working relationships both between the BND and
the eighty-five or so of the community banks with which it regularly
meets, and among the state's banks, themselves, creating foundations
for policy discussion and coordinated action that have proven
instrumental in disaster relief and other matters. 7 Here, too, actors
productively used multiple logics and organizational diversity to
upgrade financial markets, and to accomplish things and make
investments which money center banks seem unable or unwilling to
pursue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Discussions of financial reform and high road capitalism
typically focus on regulation and antitrust policies as the basic
countervailing mechanisms for disciplining corporations and upgrading
markets, broadening the options in this age of neoliberal governance to
include softer touch regulation, self-regulation, enhanced information
and rating schemes, and corporate governance reforms that harness
market forces to similar ends. This Article documents an additional
class of countervailing forces and reform: rejecting institutional mono-
cropping and centralization in favor of promoting organizational
diversity within financial markets via alternative, dedicated systems of
community banking and cooperative, mutual and local, state-owned
enterprise. Such systems display some surprising performance
possibilities. They have provided small businesses and middle class
communities with alternatives to for-profit provision of vital financial
services, subjecting centralized financial institutions to direct
competition, and creating redundancies in markets that help buffer small
businesses, farmers, and local economies from crises. They have re-tied
financial systems to small business and local economic development,
tempering the one-sided pursuit of financial profits in national and
76. Keeton et al., supra note 6, at 24-29; Scott Hein et al., Uniqueness of Community
Banks, supra note 6, at 15, 18-23 (2005); Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Small
Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank
Organisational Structure, 112 EcON. J. 32, 37-40 (2002).
77. JUNKER, supra note 45, at 146-48; Garver, supra note 47, at 5; Peterson, supra note
69, at 9; Sather, supra note 53, at 4.
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international securities markets, and helping to restore finance to its
infrastructural role. They have also introduced new forms of
competition and productive investment into financial markets, fostering
rivalry based on innovation and improvement, and harnessing those
markets to broader public purposes.
Equally intriguing, public officials have used mixed
organizational systems and the leverage they provide to complement
standard forms of regulation and to pursue strategies of regulatory
hedging or hybridity. These might be particularly promising avenues
for regulatory redesign in current circumstances, where threats of
capture loom large and prospects for reform from above appear dim.
Strategies of fostering enterprise formation and the organization of
local, community based financial institutions rely heavily on private,
voluntary organization and market dynamics to do the work of
regulation. They may thus require less by way of building
bureaucracies, developing administrative capacities, or making overt,
detailed interventions than traditional forms of rule based regulation.
Moreover, these are, at root, Jeffersonian strategies of reform, resting on
community and local, small business development, rather than statism
and bureaucratic centralism, which might provide important rhetorical
and political leverage in public debates over reform. Lastly, the
cultivation of Jefferson paths can enhance regulatory capacities from
below, providing some leverage against capture, whether by fostering
new enterprises and competitive forces that complement conventional
regulation, by creating political constituencies to counterbalance
corporate influence, or by promoting organizational communities that
instantiate alternative visions of how financial systems can and should
be organized.
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